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1 Introduction
Faced with the rapid trend of population aging, some developed countries suﬀer
from two serious economic problems: a slowdown of growth rate and inter- and
intra- generational income inequalities.
Emphasizing that distributional changes are an important part of the eco-
nomic history of the twentieth century, Atkinson (1999) shows that the distri-
bution of earnings in the UK is not well described by ‘stability’ (Figure 1, p.
59). While the bottom decile has been almost constant, around 55 per cent of
the median since the late 1970s, the top decile has increased from 167 per cent
of the median in 1977 to 191 per cent in 1999. The significant change at the
top of the distribution worsens intragenerational income inequality. According
to the IFS estimates, the Gini coeﬃcient has increased by 10 percentage points
since the late 1970s (Figure 2)1.
OECD (1998) presents some evidence that intergenerational income inequal-
ity becomes worsened. In OECD countries as a whole, the per capita income of
the household where the head is aged 65 or above has reached some 84 per cent
of the average income of all age groups in the mid 1990s, which is the same level
as for the household where the head is aged 30 or less. However, the income of
the older age group has increased by 3.4 per cent for some ten years, while the
income of the younger age group has decreased by 7.4 per cent (Table IV.1, p.
57). If the trends continue, the income diﬀerence will be seriously worsened.
This paper attempts to construct an analytical model consistent with the
phenomena observed in Atkinson (1999) and OECD (1998) and to analyze the
relationship between growth and inequality in a context of population aging.
We use an extended model of the accidental bequest (Abel, 1985) not only be-
cause the model highlights the important role of intergenerational transfers in
the capital market2, but also because wealth explains non-negligible factors of
inheritance inequality3. One of the main extensions is to endogenize the fertility
rate. It has two merits. First, it gives the relationship between the mortality
decline and the fertility decline, which is commonly observed in developed coun-
tries. Second, it enables us to examine intragenerational inequality analytically
in the accidental bequest model, which is typically complicated by wealth ac-
cumulation. With some assumptions, we have a two-class economy in which a
higher income group receives some bequests from the previous generation and
a lower income group receives nothing.
We use an old-age mortality rate as an explanatory variable because our
interest is mainly in the phenomena in developed countries, where old-age mor-
tality has been improved and is forecast to be further improved while, at the
same time, the economic impact of the infant mortality rate is fairly small.
There seems to be room for argument about what kind of index we should
use in order to evaluate income inequalities. To avoid discretionary use as
much as possible, we use three inequality indices. First, we compare the income
1The distribution of wealth is more concentrated and skewed to higher income groups than
the distribution of earnings. See, for example, Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull (2003)
and De Nardi (2005).
2 In an influential study, Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1981) estimate that a large fraction of the
US capital stock was attributable to intergenerational transfers.
3Bowles and Gintis (2002) decomposes a correlation between parent income and oﬀspring
income, which is estimated 0.32, into several causal channels. Wealth accounts for 0.12, which
is much higher than schooling (0.07), race (0.07), and IQ (0.04).
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diﬀerence between the rich and the poor. Second, we use the Gini coeﬃcient.
These indices can capture the intragenerational inequality. Finally, we use a
conventional index for the optimal income distribution based on a Bentham-
Lerner social welfare function. It enables us to measure the intergenerational
inequality, although social welfare itself is somewhat discretionary.
We have two analytical results. First, in earlier phases of population aging, a
decrease in the old age mortality rate encourages economic growth and worsens
inter- and intra- generational inequalities. Thus, we have a positive relationship
between inequality and growth. Second, in the process of population aging, the
mortality decline may be harmful to economic growth. Also income inequal-
ities are worsened in some circumstances. In this phase, we have a negative
relationship between inequality and growth.
The mechanism of our model is simple. Assuming homothetic preferences,
the marginal propensity to save out of wealth would be constant. When un-
earned income such as a bequest is added to full income, the saving rate, which
is measured by the ratio of saving to wage income, increases with the amount of
bequests. Since the higher income group receives some bequests and the lower
income group receives nothing, the former has a higher propensity to save out
of wage income than the latter. In this setting, population aging has two ef-
fects on the aggregate saving rate. First, it increases the aggregate saving rate
directly by increasing precautionary saving for the prolonged retirement and in-
directly by increasing the accidental bequest. The bequest-wage ratio is relevant
because the higher income group has a higher propensity to save. Second, pop-
ulation aging reduces the frequency of accidental bequests, which implies that
the population share of the higher income group decreases. This distributional
eﬀect decreases aggregate saving. Whether the aggregate saving rate increases
in the process of population aging depends on the magnitude of the positive
propensity eﬀect and the negative distributional eﬀect. In the earlier phases
where the old age mortality rate is relatively high, the positive propensity eﬀect
is dominant because a decrease in the mortality rate boosts the bequest-wage
ratio as well as the marginal propensity to save out of wealth. In this case the
aggregate saving rate increases. In the process of population aging, however,
the negative distributional eﬀect may be dominant in a case where the physical
capital externality is relatively weak. If it is the case, we have a hump-shaped
pattern of the growth rate with respect to the old-age mortality rate4.
Population aging also has a significant impact on the income distribution.
Assume that intragenerational income inequality is measured by the income
diﬀerence between the higher and the lower income group. In the process of
population aging, the higher income group becomes richer and the lower in-
come group remains in the previous relative position because the increase in
the bequest-wage ratio is relevant only to the higher income group. The steady
increase in the top decile and the stagnancy in the bottom decile are consis-
tent with the phenomena which has taken place since the late 1970s in the UK
(Atkinson, 1999). Combining the eﬀects of population aging on the growth rate
4 In an endogenous growth model à la Romer (1986), the growth rate of per capital income
is related positively to the aggregate saving rate and negatively to the fertility rate. It can
be shown below that the fertility rate decreases with population aging, which is well known
as the demographic transition in the modern growth regime (Galor and Weil (1998, 2000)).
Combining the saving eﬀect and the fertility eﬀect, we can derive a hump-shaped pattern of
the growth rate.
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and income inequality, we observe that the relationship is at first positive and
then negative in the process of population aging.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 compares
and contrasts our paper with the related literature. Section 3 introduces the
basic model and derives the equilibrium condition on a balanced growth path.
The eﬀect of population aging on the growth rate is examined. Section 4 ex-
amines how population aging aﬀects the intra- and inter-generational income
inequalities. Combining the results in section 3 and 4, we can discuss a dy-
namic relationship between inequality and growth from a demographic point of
view. The final section concludes the paper.
2 Related literature
Theoretically, this paper is relevant to the following two important issues. First,
it gives an answer to the question whether income inequality is positively or neg-
atively related to the income level in a conventional growth model, or to the
equilibrium growth rate in an endogenous growth model. Many papers assume
that income inequality arises from capital market imperfection5. Special atten-
tion has been paid to a borrowing constraint on education loans since Galor and
Zeira (1993) demonstrate the important role of the initial distribution of wealth
in macroeconomics (Galor and Zang (1997), Owen and Weil (1998), Dahan and
Tsiddon (1998), Hazan and Berdugo (2002), and Checchi and García-Peñalosa
(2004) among others). With a convex technology of human capital formation,
these models can generate multiple equilibria, which implies that there exists a
threshold level of the initial wealth. The initial distribution of wealth matters
because it determines the threshold level. It can be shown in some circum-
stances that a higher equilibrium becomes a unique steady state if the variance
of the distribution is relatively small. If it is the case, we can observe a nega-
tive relationship between the income level and income inequality. Focusing on
annuity market imperfection, this paper demonstrates a non-linear relationship
between growth and inequality from a demographic point of view6. It seems
plausible to take the recent change in wealth distribution in developed countries
as an attribute of the demographic change. This demographic change matters
because it determines both the wealth distribution and the growth rate.
Second, this paper gives an answer to the question of how much the distrib-
utional consideration is relevant to the growth eﬀect of population aging. Rep-
resentative agent models have rather optimistic conclusions. Ehrlich and Lui
(1991) show that a stagnant equilibrium can take oﬀ into a growth equilibrium
when either the young-age or old-age mortality rate decreases. Endogenizing the
schooling time, Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil (2000) show that an increase
in life expectancy has a positive impact on human capital formation as well
as aggregate consumption. In the endogenous growth model à la Lucas (1988)
which has an actuarially fair annuity market, Zhang and Zhang (2001) show
that a decrease in the old age mortality rate encourages economic growth both
by increasing human capital investment and by decreasing the fertility rate.
5See, for example, Bénabou (1996).
6 Some papers conclude in the other contexts that the relationship between growth and
inequality depends on the stage of economic development (see Aghion and Bolton (1992),
Galor and Tsiddon (1997), and Banerjee and Duflo (2000)).
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Similar results are also obtained in Yakita (2001). On the other hand, some
papers recognize that the growth eﬀect of population aging may be negative in
the accidental bequest model. Assuming a constant population, Fuster (1999),
Cipriani (2000), and Zhang, Zhang, and Lee (2003) show that the growth rate
is hump-shaped with respect to the mortality rate. It can be inferred that the
distributional consideration behind the result is relevant to the growth eﬀect of
population aging. The model of this paper is diﬀerent from Fuster (1999) and
Zhang, Zhang, and Lee (2003) in that it endogenizes the fertility rate, although
the motivation itself is far diﬀerent. Our model is similar to Zhang and Zhang
(2001), which elaborates on how to analyze alternative bequest motives which
aﬀect the rates of fertility, saving, and growth as well as the eﬀect of pay-as-
you-go social security. It is of great benefit to our model construction, but the
analytical focus is far diﬀerent. Our focuses are not only on the growth eﬀect
of population aging but also on the income distribution.
3 Model
3.1 Household
We use a two-period overlapping generations model with uncertain lifetime. An
individual newly born into the economy lives for two periods at most. In the
first period of life, he works, consumes, saves, and has children. At the end of
the period, he faces a probability of dying, p ∈ (0, 1). This probability is com-
mon knowledge within the same generation and across diﬀerent generations. We
assume that the longevity risk cannot be hedged by annuity insurance. If he
survives into the second period, he consumes the fruits of his saving without
leaving bequests. If he dies, he leaves unintended bequests equally to his chil-
dren. Individuals in the same generation are diﬀerentiated by their ancestors’
longevity history because the unintended bequest makes their initial assets het-
erogeneous. Denoting by i (i = 0, 1, 2, ...) the number of successive ancestors
who died in the first period of life, the population share of type i, who belongs
to group i, is given by (1− p)pi.7
The expected utility function of type i born in period t is represented by
ut(i) = ln c1t(i) + (1− p)α1 ln c2t+1(i) + α2 lnnt(i) (1)
c1 and c2 stand for young-age and old-age consumption, respectively. n > 0
stands for the number of children. α1 is a private discount factor, and α2 is a
preference parameter attached to the number of children.
The budget constraints in the first and second period are respectively given
by
bt(i) + wtlt(i) = c1t(i) + st(i) (2)
(1 + rt+1)st(i) = c2t+1(i) (3)
7Precisely, the total number of types in period t is equal to t + 1, which must be a finite
number. Assume that the model economy starts at period 1. Assume also that a fraction
(1− p) of individuals who are born at the beginning of period 1 do not receive bequests (type
0) and that the rest of the generation receive some bequests (say, type 1). In the next period,
the population share of types 0, 1, and 2 are respectively given by 1− p, (1− p)p, and p2. In
the same way, the population share of type i (i = 0, 1, ...t−1) in period t is (1−p)pi, and that
of type t is given by pt. However, the economic impact of type t in period t may be measure
zero if t is suﬃciently large.
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where l and s stand for working time and savings, respectively. w is a wage rate
and r is an interest rate. b stands for bequests received at birth. Since parents
of type 0 do not leave bequests, bt(0) = 0.
The cost of having one child is represented by a rearing time cost, v. Nor-
malizing available time in the first period to unity, the time constraint is given
by
lt(i) + vnt(i) = 1 (4)
The optimization problem is to maximize (1) subject to (2), (3), and (4).
Solving it, we have the demand for children,
nt(i) =
α2[1 + bˆt(i)]
v[1 + α1(1− p) + α2]
(5)
where bˆt(i) stands for a bequest-wage ratio,
bˆt(i) ≡
bt(i)
wt
The labor supply is given by
lt(i) = 1−
α2[1 + bˆt(i)]
1 + α1(1− p) + α2
(6)
The young-age consumption and the savings are respectively given by
c1t(i) =
[1 + bˆt(i)]wt
1 + α1(1− p) + α2
(7)
st(i) =
(1− p)α1[1 + bˆt(i)]wt
1 + α1(1− p) + α2
(8)
With probability 1−p, he survives into the second period of life and consumes
the fruits of his saving,
c2t+1(i) = (1 + rt+1)st(i) (9)
With probability p, he dies at the end of the first period and leaves bequests
to his children. Since they belong to group i+1, the bequest per child, bt+1(i+1),
is represented by
nt(i)bt+1(i+ 1) = (1 + rt+1)st(i) (10)
Substituting (5) and (8) into (10), we have
bt+1(i) = (1− p)v
α1
α2
wt(1 + rt+1) ≡ bt+1 (11)
for any i ≥ 1. Equation (10) shows that bt+1(i+1) is proportional to st(i)/nt(i).
Equations (5) and (8) show that the impact of bˆt(i) on fertility and saving are
similar to one another, given that the utility function is log-linear and the cost
function is linear. Thus, we know that bt+1(i+1) is independent of bt(i), which
implies that all individuals except for type 0 receive the same amount of be-
quests. Although the assumptions seem somewhat stringent, they drastically
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simplify the analysis of the accidental bequest model, which is typically compli-
cated by wealth accumulation. They enable us to have analytical solutions to
examine the intergenerational income inequality between the young-age savers
and the old-age dissavers, as well as the intragenerational income inequality be-
tween the poor (type 0) and the rich (type i ≥ 1) in the process of population
aging8.
From an individual viewpoint, a decrease in the old age mortality rate in-
creases the accidental bequest because people are willing to increase precau-
tionary savings. It worsens intragenerational inequality between the rich and
the poor. Since the rich have a larger propensity to save than the poor, the
mortality decline would contribute to capital formation.
From the macroeconomic viewpoint, however, the mortality decline decreases
the population share of the rich. Therefore it depends on the magnitude of the
positive propensity eﬀect relative to the negative share eﬀect whether population
aging contributes to capital formation or not.
3.2 Aggregation
The population share of group 0 is 1 − p and that of the other groups i ≥ 1 isP∞
i=1(1− p)pi = p. Denoting by Nt the total population born at period t, the
aggregate variables are respectively given as follows.
The bequest transferred to generation t
Bt = bt(0)(1− p)Nt + btpNt = pbˆtwtNt (12)
Average fertility rate
nt = nt(0)(1− p) + nt(i)p
=
α2(1 + pbˆt)
v[1 + α1(1− p) + α2]
(13)
Aggregate labor supply
Lt = lt(0)(1− p)Nt + lt(i)pNt
=
"
1− α2(1 + pbˆt)
1 + α1(1− p) + α2
#
Nt (14)
Young-age consumption
C1t = c1t(0)(1− p)Nt + c1t(i)pNt
=
1 + pbˆt
1 + α1(1− p) + α2
wtNt (15)
Aggregate saving
St = st(0)(1− p)Nt + st(i)pNt
=
(1− p)α1(1 + pbˆt)
1 + α1(1− p) + α2
wtNt (16)
8 If the assumptions are relaxed, the population distribution becomes complex since the
fertility rate depends on the wealth accumulation. One can incorporate fertility decision into
a computational general-equilibrium method such as Huggett (1996) and Huggett and Ventura
(2000), although it is beyond the scope of the paper.
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A fraction (1− p) of the savings is consumed by old-age people,
C2t+1 = (1− p)(1 + rt+1)St
=
(1− p)2α1(1 + pbˆt)
1 + α1(1− p) + α2
wtNt(1 + rt+1), (17)
and the rest is transferred to the next generation as accidental bequests,
Bt+1 = p(1 + rt+1)St
=
p(1− p)α1(1 + pbˆt)
1 + α1(1− p) + α2
wtNt(1 + rt+1) (18)
Note that (18) is equivalent to (12) given that (11) is satisfied.
3.3 Production
Aggregate production is represented by a constant-returns-to-scale production
function,
Yt = F (Kt, AtLt)
where Y , K, and L stand for output, capital stock, and labor, respectively. A
stands for the labor-augmenting stock of knowledge.
Following the idea of Arrow (1962), Romer (1986), and Grossman and Yana-
gawa (1993), we specify the stock of knowledge as
At =
1
a
Kt
Lt
where a > 0 stands for the strength of externality. This specification may well fit
for the developed countries concerned because they could stay on the technology
frontier.
Assuming competitive factor markets, we have
rt = r = f
0(a) (19)
wt = ηkt (20)
where kt = Kt/Lt stands for the capital labor ratio, f(.) = F (., 1) is the pro-
duction function per eﬀective labor9, and
η ≡ f(a)
a
− f 0(a) > 0
Since the social rate of return of capital is ∂Yt/∂Kt = r + η, η stands for the
magnitude of the externality related to knowledge accumulation.
3.4 Equilibrium
The demographic pattern follows
Nt+1 = ntNt (21)
9We assume f 0 > 0, f 00 < 0, f(0) = 0, limk→+0 f 0(k) = +∞, and limk→∞ f 0(k) = 0.
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The capital market clears when
Kt+1 = St (22)
The goods market clears when
Kt + Yt = C1t + C2t +Kt+1 (23)
which can be derived from Walras’ law.
The per capita growth rate is defined by
gt ≡
Kt+1/Nt+1
Kt/Nt
− 1
From (20), (21), and (22), we have
1 + gt =
ηsˆt
nt
(24)
where sˆt stands for a saving rate which is defined by the ratio of aggregate
saving to wage income10,
sˆt ≡
St
wtLt
(25)
Equation (24) shows that the growth rate is related positively to the saving
rate and negatively to the fertility rate. Substituting (14) and (16) into (25),
we have
sˆt =
α1(1− p)(1 + pbˆt)
1 + α1(1− p)− α2pbˆt
(26)
From (14) and (20), the wage growth rate is given by
wt+1
wt
= (1 + gt)
1 + α1(1− p)− α2pbˆt
1 + α1(1− p)− α2pbˆt+1
(27)
Dividing both side of (11) by wt+1, and using (27), we have
bˆt+1 =
α1
α2
v(1− p) 1 + r
1 + gt
1 + α1(1− p)− α2pbˆt+1
1 + α1(1− p)− α2pbˆt
(28)
The dynamics of gt, nt, sˆt, and bˆt are characterized by (13), (24), (26), and
(28). Since the aggregate production is AK technology, an equilibrium jumps
immediately to a new equilibrium when the mortality rate changes. To show
this, substituting (13) and (26) into (24), we can solve the growth rate as a
function of bˆt,
1 + gt = η
α1
α2
v(1− p) 1 + α1(1− p) + α2
1 + α1(1− p)− α2pbˆt
(29)
10The definition of the saving rate follows Zhang and Zhang (2001). From (20) and (22), the
saving rate is proportional to the aggregate saving rate, Kt+1/Yt. Note that sˆt may exceed
one if the share of bequest in the household income is relatively large.
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Other things being equal, the growth rate is increasing in the bequest-income
ratio. Substituting (29) into (28), the bequest-income ratio is determined by a
single equation,
bˆt+1 =
1 + r
η
1 + α1(1− p)− α2pbˆt+1
1 + α1(1− p) + α2
which implies that bˆt+1 is adjusted to a new steady state when p changes in
period t+ 1.
On a balanced growth path (BGP), per capita variables grow at a constant
rate of g, and aggregate variables grow at a constant rate of g + n. The BGP
condition requires that g, n, sˆ, and bˆ are constant. From (13), (24), (26),
and (28), the equilibrium on the BGP is characterized by the following four
equations:
n =
α2(1 + pbˆ)
v[1 + α1(1− p) + α2]
(13’)
1 + g =
ηsˆ
n
(24’)
sˆ =
α1(1− p)(1 + pbˆ)
1 + α1(1− p)− α2pbˆ
(26’)
bˆ =
α1
α2
v(1− p)1 + r
1 + g
(28’)
In order to make the result clear, we use an alternative parameter related to
the knowledge externality,
β ≡ η
1 + r
=
f(a)/a− f 0(a)
1 + f 0(a)
A higher β corresponds to a higher knowledge externality.11
Solving (13’), (24’), (26’), and (28’), we have
n =
1
v
α2(β + p)
β[1 + α1(1− p)] + α2(β + p)
(30)
bˆ =
1 + α1(1− p)
β[1 + α1(1− p)] + α2(β + p)
(31)
sˆ =
α1(1− p)(β + p)
β[1 + α1(1− p)]
(32)
1 + g =
α1
α2
ηv(1− p)
·
1 +
α2(β + p)
β[1 + α1(1− p)]
¸
(33)
The comparative statics analysis gives the following propositions:
Proposition 1 When the mortality rate decreases, the fertility rate decreases
and the bequest-wage ratio increases.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating (30) and (31) with respect to p, we have dn/dp > 0
and dbˆ/dp < 0.
11β corresponds to z in Zhang and Zhang (2001).
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The former result illustrates the demographic transition in developed coun-
tries. Similar results are obtained in several altruistic bequest models. The
latter result is related to the precautionary saving. When their lifetime is pro-
longed, people increase savings for their retirement, which in turn increases
accidental bequests. The rich become richer, and the poor remain poor in the
process of population aging.
Proposition 2 When the mortality rate decreases, the saving rate first in-
creases and then decreases if and only if
β < βs ≡ 1 + α1 (34)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 says that the saving rate is hump-shaped with respect to the
mortality rate if the externality is weak. As is well-known, a decrease in the old
age mortality rate increases the propensity to save at individual levels. However,
the other eﬀect, a distributional eﬀect, should be recognized because agents are
born with heterogeneous assets. We know that the rich have a larger propensity
to save than the poor, and that the population share of the rich decreases with
the mortality decline. The saving rate falls if the negative share eﬀect dominates
the positive propensity eﬀect, which may occur when the externality is weak and
the level of the mortality rate has been low enough. Our model contrasts with
the altruistic bequest models in this respect, which arises from the existence of
heterogeneous savers.
Proposition 3 When the mortality rate decreases, the growth rate first in-
creases and then decreases if and only if
β < βg ≡
α2(1 + α1)
(1 + α1)2 + α2
(35)
Proof. See Appendix.
In contrast with Fuster (1999) and Zhang, Zhang, and Lee (2003), the mor-
tality rate which maximizes the growth rate does not coincide with the one
that maximizes the saving rate because fertility is endogenous.12 Proposition 1
states that the fertility rate monotonically decreases according to the mortality
decline. This demographic change promotes per capita income growth. Propo-
sition 2 states that the saving rate first increases then may decrease according to
the mortality decline. Thus, in earlier phases of population aging, the mortality
decline encourages economic growth both by the fertility and saving eﬀect. In
the process of population aging, however, the mortality decline becomes harmful
to economic growth if the negative saving eﬀect dominates the positive fertil-
ity eﬀect. From (34) and (35), we know that βg < βs, which implies that the
hump-shaped pattern of the growth rate can be observed if the externality is
weak enough to make the negative saving eﬀect dominate the positive fertility
eﬀect.
12Zhang, Zhang, and Lee (2003) derives a similar hump-shaped pattern in a Lucas-type
endogenous growth model. The reason is that it is the aggregate saving rate that determines
the growth rate if the public schooling is not controlled (p.91).
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4 Growth and inequality
This section examines a dynamic relationship between growth and inequality
in the context of population aging. We use two alternative indices to measure
the intragenerational inequality: income diﬀerence between the rich and the
poor, and the Gini coeﬃcient. To measure the intergenerational inequality,
we use a criterion for the optimal income distribution based on a Bentham-
Lerner social welfare function. When the mortality rate decreases, we show
that (i) the income diﬀerence between the two groups monotonically increases;
(ii) the Gini coeﬃcient first increases and then decreases; and (iii) the index of
intergenerational inequality monotonically increases.
4.1 Intragenerational inequality
4.1.1 Income diﬀerence between the rich and the poor
Since the full income of the rich is (1 + bˆ)wt and that of the poor is wt, the
income diﬀerence can be measured simply by the bequest-wage ratio, bˆ. We
know that it increases monotonically with the mortality decline (Proposition
1), and that the growth rate first increases and then may decrease (Proposition
3). Therefore we have a positive relationship between growth and inequality
in the earlier phases, and the relationship can be negative in the process of
population aging.
4.1.2 Gini coeﬃcient
It would be misleading to emphasize the hump-shaped pattern between growth
and inequality measured by the income diﬀerence between the two groups be-
cause the population share of the rich group decreases with population aging.
If the share eﬀect is dominant, then we may observe that the economy wide
income distribution is improved.
Since our model economy is a two-class economy, we can calculate the Gini
coeﬃcient easily. The income distribution is wt for the poor (a fraction of 1−p)
and (1 + bˆ)wt for the rich (p). The mean income is (1 − p)wt + p(1 + bˆ)wt =
(1+pbˆ)wt and the mean diﬀerence is 2(1−p)pbˆwt. Therefore the Gini coeﬃcient,
denoted by γ, is given by (1− p)pbˆ/(1 + pbˆ). Using (31), we have
γ = p(1− p)β + p
1 + α1(1− p)
1 + α1(1− p) + α2
(36)
If the level of mortality rate is high, a mortality decline increases the Gini
coeﬃcient since the wealth eﬀect dominates the share eﬀect. In the process of
population aging, however, the share eﬀect becomes dominant, which decreases
the Gini coeﬃcient. Formally we have the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The Gini coeﬃcient has a unique interior maximum in (0, 1).
Proof. See Appendix.
We can derive the relationship between the growth rate and the Gini coeﬃ-
cient by combining Propositions 3 and 4. When the externality is weak (β < βg),
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both are hump-shaped with respect to the mortality rate. It implies that the
inequality is positively related to the growth rate for a higher and a lower level
of mortality rate. The relationship could be negative when the mortality rate
is intermediate. Figure 1 shows a locus of (g(p), γ(p)) when β < βg.13 If the
externality is significant (β > βg), the growth rate increases monotonically with
the mortality decline. In this case, the relationship would be first positive and
then negative in the process of population aging. Figure 2 illustrates an example
when β > βg.
Figure 1. Growth versus Distribution when the externality is weak
43210
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0
growth
gini
α1 = 0.5, α2 = 0.2, v = 0.1, η = 10, and β = 0.05.
Figure 2. Growth versus Distribution when the externality is strong
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α1 = 0.5, α2 = 0.2, v = 0.1, η = 10, and β = 0.15.
13 It is assumed that α1 = 0.5, α2 = 0.2, v = 0.1, η = 10, and β = 0.05. From (35), the
critical value is βg = 0.122.
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4.2 Intergenerational inequality
In order to examine intergenerational inequality, we first derive a criterion for the
optimal income distribution based on a Bentham-Lerner social welfare function
such as
Wt =W (Ntu1(c1t), (1− p)Nt−1u2(c2t))
where c1t ≡ C1t/Nt and c2t ≡ C2t/[(1− p)Nt−1] stand for per capita young-age
and old-age consumption at period t, respectively. Maximizing the social welfare
subject to the resource constraint, (23), we have the optimality condition for
consumption allocation,
µt ≡
W1u
0
1(c1t)
W2u02(c2t)
= 1
where Wi stands for the ith derivative (i = 1, 2). µt stands for the conventional
index of intergenerational income distribution. If µt is larger (smaller) than
one, then the distribution is in favor of the old (young) generation. Further, we
specify the social welfare function such as
W = Ntu1 + δ · (1− p)Nt−1u2
u1(c) = u2(c) = ln c
δ ∈ (0, 1) stands for a social discount factor, which may diﬀer from the
private discount factor, α1. Then we have
µt =
1
δ
c2t
c1t
The distribution is optimal when c2t/c1t = δ. From (15), (17), and (21), the
index on the BGP is given by
µ =
α1
δ (1− p)
1 + r
1 + g
(37)
The mortality decline aﬀects the inequality index in two ways. First, it di-
rectly increases µ. The income distribution moves in favor of the old generation
because the marginal value of old-age consumption increases. Second, it indi-
rectly decreases µ through a change in the growth rate. When the growth rate
increases, the present value of old-age consumption decreases. Therefore the
income distribution moves in favor of the young generation. It can be shown
that the net eﬀect is positive because, with (26), we can transform (37) into
µ =
α2
vδ bˆ
It is the accidental bequest that plays a critical role in intergenerational
inequality. From Proposition 2, we know dbˆ/dp < 0 thus dµ/dp < 0. The
mortality decline skews consumption allocation in favor of the old generation.
The trend of population aging makes dissavers rich and savers poor. Combining
this with Proposition 3, we have a positive relationship between growth and
inequality in the earlier phases, and the relationship can be negative in the
process of population aging.
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5 Conclusions
Theoretically, this paper has three contributions to the related literature. First,
it shows that the growth rate may be hump-shaped with respect to the mortality
rate when the bequest is accidental and the externality is weak. It contrasts
with the results obtained in the models where bequests are motivated by pure
or impure altruism. The reason is that the accidental bequest makes the initial
asset heterogeneous and that the mortality decline has a distributional eﬀect
on aggregate savings. Second, compared with the literature on the accidental
bequest, this paper endogenizes the fertility rate. Since the decreased fertility
rate has a positive impact on the growth rate of per capita income, it can
encourage economic growth even if the saving rate decreases. Specifically, if the
externality is intermediate, β ∈ (βg,βs), then the mortality decline increases the
growth rate although it decreases the saving rate. Third, the inter- and intra-
generational inequalities are considered in the context of population aging. The
bequest wage ratio, bˆ, plays a critical role in the inequalities. The mortality
decline increases bˆ, which implies that the trend of population aging worsens
both inter- and intra- generational inequalities. When the growth rate is hump-
shaped, this implies that the relationship between growth and inequality is at
first positive and then negative in the process of population aging.
The policy implications of the paper should be treated cautiously as it exam-
ines the growth rate and income distribution, but not the welfare. Nevertheless,
it may alert us to the rather optimistic standpoint found in related literature. In
the process of population aging, some developed countries could find themselves
in a stagnant and inequitable situation in the near future. If the governments
are concerned about this, this paper suggests they should carry out a transfer
policy in favor of the younger generation who have a higher propensity to save
and thus contribute to capital formation.
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Appendix
[Proof of Proposition 2] Diﬀerentiating (32) with respect to p, we have
dsˆ
dp
=
α1 {(1− p)[1 + α1(1− p)]− (β + p)}
β[1 + α1(1− p)]2
We know
dsˆ
dp
|p=1 = −(1 + β)α1β < 0
dsˆ
dp
|p=0 = α1(1 + α1 − β)β(1 + α1)2
Since the numerator of dsˆ/dp is a quadratic function of p with a positive
coeﬃcient of the quadratic term, the saving rate has an interior maximum if
and only if dsˆ/dp|p=0 > 0, that is,
β < 1 + α1
[Proof of Proposition 3] From (33), we know
1 + g = G(p) =
α1
α2
ηvφ(p)
where
φ(p) = (1− p)ϕ(p)
ϕ(p) = 1 + α2(β + p)β[1 + α1(1− p)]
Note that G(0) > 0, which contrasts with Foster (1999) and Cipriani (2000).
First, we show that the growth rate is concave with respect to p, that is, G00 < 0.
Then, we show that G0(0) > 0 is equivalent to (35). Since G(1) = 0 and
G(0) > 0, g has an interior maximum if and only if the condition (35) is satisfied
because of the concavity.
We know
φ0(p) = −ϕ(p) + (1− p)ϕ0(p)
φ00(p) = −2ϕ0(p) + (1− p)ϕ00(p)
and
ϕ0(p) = α2(1 + α1 + βα1)β[1 + α1(1− p)]2
> 0
ϕ00(p) = 2α1ϕ
0(p)
1 + α1(1− p)
.
First, we have
φ00(p) = − 2ϕ
0(p)
1 + α1(1− p)
< 0
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which implies that G is concave.
Second, we have
φ0(0) = α2β(1 + α1)
+
α1α2
(1 + α1)2
−
µ
1 +
α2
1 + α1
¶
Thus, φ0(0) > 0 is equivalent to (35).
[Proof of Proposition 4] From (36), we have γ = (1− p)f1(p)f2(p), where
f1(p) = 1−
β
β + p
f2(p) = 1−
α2
1 + α1(1− p) + α2
First, we have γ(0) = γ(1) = 0.
Second, we have f 01 > 0, f
00
1 < 0, f
0
2 < 0, and f
00
2 < 0 for p ∈ [0, 1], and
γ0(p) = −f1f2 + (1− p)(f 01f2 + f1f 02)
γ00(p) = −2(f 01f2 + f1f 02) + (1− p)(f 001 f2 + 2f 01f 02 + f1f 002 )
Since γ(p) is continuous in [0, 1] and γ(p) > 0 for ∀p ∈ (0, 1), there exists at
least one solution p∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that it maximizes γ. The necessary condition,
γ0(p∗) = 0, requires
f 01f2 + f1f
0
2 =
f1f2
1− p∗ > 0
which implies γ00(p∗) < 0. Therefore we know that γ does not have any local
minimums in (0, 1). It proves the uniqueness of p∗.
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